

Moving Target Defense for Space Systems





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2 Agenda

Intro

- BLUF
- Who is Sandia?

Background

- Motivation
- Moving target defense
- MIL-STD-1553

Algorithm

- State Generation
- Usage
- Randomness Characterization
- Unpredictability Quantification

Experimentation

- Description
- Challenges
- Results

Machine Learning Attacks

- Methodology
- Results

Future Work

- IPv4 random port generator
- 2FA Passphrase Generator
- Transparent filesystem



Intro



BLUF

Accomplishments

Patent awarded, 4 publications, multiple (invited) talks

Obtained GUN copyright for MTD algorithm software

22023 R&D 100 Finalist

Key Results

Reduced adversarial knowledge by 97% during exfiltration cyber resilience experiment

□ Identified hopping frequency requirements to defeat exfiltration adversary capable of learning

Quantified randomness and unpredictability of MTD algorithm

Enhanced MTD's random sequence generator to defeat machine learning methods

Future Work

□IPv4 random port generator

□2FA Passphrase Generator

Transparent filesystem

U.S. National Laboratories



Sandia Has Two Main Locations



Science and Technology Advancing Resilience in Contested Space STARCS Mission Campaign

It's not Artificial Intelligence: It's Artificial Instinct



Sensor Protection

- Defensive Materials
- Data security/recovery
- Demonstrate protection

Sensor Layer


Electronics



Cognitive Analytics

Identify attacks

- Adapt to operate-through
- Demonstrate on threatdefended hardware



Neuromorphicallyinspired

Threat-Defended Hardware

- Modsim Tools
- Hardened COTS
- Special Shielding
- Testable Hardware


Algorithms



Background



9 Cyber Security vs. Cyber Resilience






Concern: High consequence systems are becoming an attractive target for nationstate adversaries

11 Moving Target Defense

- •Dynamic reconfiguration of environment
- •Randomly change node address after n messages
- •Mitigates risk of an attacker guessing the correct addresses and injecting data



Hypothesis: MTD increases cyber resilience

Hypothesis: integration of MTD with a **real-time protocol can increase cyber resilience** of platforms using the protocol

Key Research Questions:

- 1. Can MTD be implemented in a manner that maintains operational constraints (e.g., accuracy, latency)?
- 2. Can we provide quantitative evidence that MTD does indeed improve cyber resilience?


Uniqueness: Real-time, SWaP constrained systems Uniqueness: Doesn't require anomaly detection




MTD Algorithm



MIL-STD-1553 Bus Architecture 14



15 Typical BC-RT Message



Design Challenges

Keep underlying protocol – determinism, predictability, reliability, and real-time operation

Dynamic address generation – each node must index or use a disjoint set of addresses as compared to other nodes on the network. Also, have the ability to increase or decrease speed of address hopping

Synchronization – provide fast recovery if a device loses sync


Entropy – provide enough randomness

Periodicity – provide sufficiently long hopping patterns


Authenticity – determine if MTD commands are authentic using analog signatures, MACs, MICs, etc.

Today: Describe a patent-pending, novel MTD algorithm for use on MIL-STD-1553


17 MTD Algorithm



¹⁸ State Matrix (Arrays) – Static Offset




State Matrix (Arrays) – Current Offset 19




²⁰ State Generation Performance (Elapsed Time)

Elapsed Time (ms) vs Rounds




²¹ State Generation Performance (Average Time)



Average Time (us) vs Rounds


Number of Arrays	Approximate Size (KB = 1024)
1	0.03125
4	0.125
16	0.5
64	2
256	8
1024	32
4096	128
16384	512
65536	2048

Entropy Results



Preliminary findings

- Frequency of addresses is not perfectly uniform, leaving some area for improvement
- Entropy for 256 columns is 0.9984
- Entropy for 65536 columns is 0.9989



Analysis Process

- 1. Create 10 state matrices with 10 PRNG seeds
- 2. For each matrix, 31 address sequences (one for each node) for each of the 12 unique combinations of offset and matrix size (3,720 sequences)
- 3. Each sequence has a length of 4,096
- 4. Calculate set of 9 unpredictability metrics and average over 31 address sequences per state matrix and unique combination
- For update period, concatenated multiple matrix sequences to simulate state matrix updates

Preliminary findings Period

- Offset method has most effect on unpredictability metrics
- Number of state matrix columns and update period do not appear to significantly affect unpredictability





Experimentation



MIL-STD-1553 Research Plan


Phase 1: Calculate Fibonacci sequence w/ and w/o MTD

- BC sends 2 DWs which represent the previous 2 numbers in the sequence
- RT consumes the 2 DWs, computes the next number and responds (when requested) by the BC with a single DW containing the new number
- Run experiment to obtain the 24th Fibonacci number
- Run experiment with MTD and update the address after every X frames (2 messages per frame)


Phase 2: Exfiltration

26

- Exfiltration data from target node on MIL-STD-1553 network
- Goal: Quantify reduction in adversarial knowledge




²⁸ MTD Commands



²⁹ MTD Command Trace

```
MESSAGE #13 -------
Time: [2019](218)14:<u>19:5</u>0.370.162.640 IM Gap: 7407.6us
BUS A - CMD:0882 (1-R-4-2) BCRT
0002 0003
Rsp Time 6.5us STS:0800
Message Time = 84.5us
MESSAGE #14 ------
Time: [2019](218)14:19:50.371.247.640 IM Gap: 1002.6us
BUS A - CMD:0CA1 (1-T-5-1)RTBC
Rsp Time 6.5us STS:0800
0005
Message Time = 64.5us
MESSAGE #15 -----
Time: [2019](218)14:<u>19:50</u>.385.049.880 IM Gap: 13739.9us
BUS A - CMD:F841 (31-R-2-1) BRDCST BCRT
0017
Message Time = 40us
MESSAGE #16 ------
Time: [2019](218)14:19:50.397.934.480 IM Gap: 12846.7us
BUS A - CMD:D882 (27-R-4-2) BCRT
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Rsp Time 6.5us STS:D800
0000
Message Time = 64.5us
```

Resilience Expt.: Exfiltration Attack Scenario




Set Up

- Attacker has corrupted an node to be an exfil listening node (red)
- Messages to/from target participant node (green) = messages of value to the attacker
- Exfil listening node monitors & exfils all messages to/from target
- With no MTD, exfil listening node will see and exfil 100% of messages to/from target

Question: does the implementation of MTD reduce the fraction of "messages of value" that are exfiltrated?

Exfil Expt.: Results


31



Frequency Decreases

In this scenario


- MTD reduces % of value messages exfiltrated by ~97%
- Experimental results match theoretical estimates



When the adversary knows the starting address for the target

- Low frequencies give poorer results in the expts
- This observation is due to relatively short length of experiments (50 generations)
- When the length is increased, the expected # of messages exfiltrated decrease closer to 3%

Exfil Expt. Results: Learning Adversary



1000 Fibonacci Generations, 25 trials

Assume adversary learns new address after X frames

Example:

- Freq = 25, learned = 8 frames, exfil = 70%
- Freq = 25, learned = 16 frames, exfil = 40%

• Freq = 25, learned = 32,
$$exfil = 0\%$$

Takeaways:

- Against a learning adversary, MTD frequency needs to be faster than adversary learning rate to significantly mitigate exfil attacks
- These data can start informing design requirements




Machine Learning



³⁴ ML Experimentation

- Given a log of all messages on the bus
 - <u>• Can you figure out the state matrix?</u>
 - Can you identify MTD messages?
 - Can you determine the next address?
 - <u>• Are any other side channels present?</u>
- Models Used
 - LSTM model for predicting the next address
 - Varied the number of previous addresses the model remembers
 - Training size varied
 - Test size always 20% of total data





Future Work



Future Work & Ideas

Realized generic structure of algorithm: 4 components

IPv4 random port generator

- Existing SNL technology
- Randomized TCP port using MTD (ADDSec)
- This algorithm allowed different keys per packet as opposed to the same key for all packets
- NDA with commercial startup to integrated technology into their product

2FA Passphrase Generator

- Implement two-factor authentication system
- Doesn't not require typical infrastructure as other systems (e.g., RSA tokens, authenticators)
- Update state matrix to represent passphrases

Transparent filesystem

- Protection against ransomware
- Can't encrypt what you don't see
- Integrate MTD into filesystem with trigger to 'reveal' hidden files

³⁸ Thank you!





Backup



40 Sandia's Impact

Sandia is often called upon to respond to high-profile events




Mars Perseverance rover

NASA's Perseverance rover landed safely on Mars after a seven-month journey through space. The event could only take place following a safe launch that had been vetted by Sandia scientists. (Courtesy of NASA/JPL-Caltech)



Cleanroom invented 1963

As the birthplace of the modern cleanroom, Sandia helped revolutionize manufacturing in electronics and pharmaceuticals and advance space exploration. \$50 billion worth of cleanrooms built worldwide.



COVID-19 Pandemic

Sandia has more than 50 COVID-related science and engineering projects that are designed to help the nation during the pandemic.

(Image by Loren Stacks)



Sustainable Energy

Sandia seeks to support the creation of a secure energy future for the US by using its capabilities to enable an uninterrupted and enduring supply of energy from domestic sources, and to assure the reliability and resiliency of the associated energy infrastructure.

41 Fulfilling Our National Security Mission



Nuclear Deterrence


National Security Programs

Energy & Homeland Security

Advanced Science & Technology Shedjær opplör i ligening i feldet for ing the i lefter opplör i ligening opplet i ligening opplet i ligening i ligening opplet i ligening i ligening opplet i listerilitati ligeni ligeni lige

42 MTD Update Command Indexing


Command Word Bit Usage



Command	Word B	it Usage
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Remo	Remote Terminal address (0 - 31) Receive or Transmit					Location (sub-address) of data (1 - 30)				Number of words to expect (1 - 32)			
1	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11							11	12	13	14	15	16
Column Selection (16 bits)													


43 **State Generation Randomness**



Percentage of Dynamic Addresses for Node 0

■ 0 ■ 1 ■ 2 ■ 3 ■ 4 ■ 5 ■ 6 ■ 7 ■ 8 ■ 9 ■ 10 ■ 11 ■ 12 ■ 13 ■ 14 ■ 15 ■ 16 ■ 17 ■ 18 ■ 19 ■ 20 ■ 21 ■ 22 ■ 23 ■ 24 ■ 25 ■ 26 ■ 27 ■ 28 ■ 29 ■ 30


44 State Generation Randomness



Percentage of Dynamic Addresses for Node 8

45 State Generation Randomness (All nodes)

Percent of Dynamic Addresses for All Nodes



State Array Performance (65536 rounds)

Random nonce generation ~ 10us Hash generation ~ 500 ms Hash verification ~ 500 ms

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Access Performance Execute state access ten million times Generate random index Access new address and store it Use new address next time (current) Average access time = 1 us

⁴⁷ Time Required to see all possible addresses (Random Index)

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Cell Offset Method	# of columns	Total	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Dev
Static	512	7686	247.96	87	606	136.82
Current	512	4083	129.13	65	278	38.14
L-Static	512	5842	188.45	85	384	70.32
L-Current	512	3988	128.64	71	239	40.36
Static	8192	5934	191.42	86	369	77.55
Current	8192	3855	124.35	71	204	36.18
L-Static	8192	4272	137.81	87	270	37.20
L-Current	8192	4259	137.39	67	244	45.07
Static	65536	5501	177.45	75	351	74.52
Current	65536	3827	123.45	71	196	33.34
L-Static	65536	3756	121.16	61	246	36.77
L-Current	65536	3587	115.71	77	198	28.72

Offset Methods

Index – 16-bit index

Static – use static address as offset

Current – use current address as offset

Offset	Selection	Index Interpretation			
Mec	hanism	Unsigned integer	Linear combination		
SS	Initial	Static	Linear-static		
eq	address				
pp N	Current	Current	Linear-current		
A	address				

16-bit index: 10-bit (sub-)index, 3-bit multiplier, 3-bit adder

Linear static (Linear-S) – c is the static address

Linear current (Linear-C) – c is the current address

 $4a+b+c \mod n = d$, where a, b, c, d, and n are unsigned integers

Time Required to see all possible addresses (Sequential index)

Cell Offset Method	Total	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Dev
Static	5842	188.452	85	384	70.322
Current	3903	125.90	73	237	34.08
L-Static	1798	58	58	58	0
L-Current	4262	137.48	85	250	36.28


Size of state matrix does not matter for sequential index

All addresses are not created equal (non-uniform distribution)

- All addresses are used given enough time
- Try different primitive (AES, LFSR, RDRAND, etc.)
- Don't need large matrix to have good entropy
- Index into state (or states) (don't generate state array on-the-fly)

Non-address attributes or different size addresses may not have same profile

Testbed



ENET2



53 MTD Commands

Start (send 128-bit nonce) • 1 CW, 8 DWs

• 31-R-1-8

Verify (HMAC-512)

- 1CW, 32 DW
- RT-T-6-32

Update (frequency)

- 1 CW, 1DW
- 16-bit index
- 31-R-2-1

Stop (DW doesn't matter) • 1CW, 1DW

- 31-R-3-1
- Add HMAC-256 to message for authenticity

Method #1

- 16-bit index
- 65536 orderings/arrays
- Use 16 bits to index
- Static address is the cell number

Method #2

- 10-bit column selection (i.e. sub-index)
- 3-bit multiplier (a)
- 3-bit adder (b)
- Static address or current address (c)
- $I = 4a + b + c \mod 31$, I = cell number

54 MTD Update

MESSAGE #13 -----Time: [2019](218)14:19:50.370.162.640 IM Gap: 7407.6us BUS A - CMD:0882 (1-R-4-2) BCRT 0002 0003 Rsp Time 6.5us STS:0800 Message Time = 84.5us MESSAGE #14 ------Time: [2019](218)14:19:50.371.247.640 IM Gap: 1002.6us BUS A - CMD:0CA1 (1-T-5-1) RTBC Rsp Time 6.5us STS:0800 0005 Message Time = 64.5us MESSAGE #15 ------Time: [2019](218)14:19:50.385.049.880 IM Gap: 13739.9us BUS A - CMD:F841 (31-R-2-1) BRDCST BCRT 0017 Message Time = 40us MESSAGE #16 ------Time: [2019](218)14:19:50.397.934.480 IM Gap: 12846.7us BUS A - CMD:D882 (27-R-4-2) BCRT 0003 0005 Rsp Time 6.5us STS:D800 Message Time = 84.5us MESSAGE #17 ------Time: [2019](218)14:19:50.399.019.440 IM Gap: 1002.6us BUS A - CMD:DCA1 (27-T-5-1) RTBC Rsp Time 6.5us STS:D800 0000 Message Time = 64.5us

55 MTD Update (2)

```
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Message Time = 64.5us
```

56 Average Overhead

Change frequency of MTD update command Increase delays so increase in message count is due only to MTD overhead 1000 runs (generations)

MTD Frequency (# of frames)	Predicted Overhead (%)	Actual Overhead (%)
1	50.0	50.1
2	25.0	25.1
3	16.7	16.7
5	10.0	10.2
10	5.0	5.0
20	2.5	2.6
50	1.0	1.0
100	0.5	0.5

57 ENET2-1553 Challenges

Flow control

• RT may not compute answer before BC requests answer

Latency

- Polling-based interrupts
- 200+ microseconds round trip time (some functionality takes multiple calls)
- Typical messages take less than 100 microseconds

Non-empty buffers during 'wrap-around'

- Previous entries in buffers not cleared
- Can disrupt calculation by providing stale data

All above issues can be addressed with code


Potential bottleneck with BM, RT, and BC using same IP stack and queues (need to validate with vendor)

Solutions:

- Purchased PCIe card to reduce latency and push the MTD performance 'envelope'
- Use separate computers for functionality

Exfil Expt.: Results

Resilience Increases




KEY RESULT

In this scenario

- MTD reduces % of value messages exfiltrated by ~97%
- Experimental results match theoretical estimates
- We can quantify how well MTD increases resilience

Exfil Expt. Results: Learning Adversary Result when adversary knows the starting address



When the adversary knows the starting address for the target

- Low frequencies give poorer results in the expts
- This observation is due to relatively short length of experiments (50 generations)
- When the length is increased, the expected # of messages exfiltrated decrease closer to 3%